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Abstract 
What does it take for a female aspirant to win a party nomination in a candidate-centered 
electoral system in an emerging democracy? Three decades after the third wave of 
democratization hit Africa, we still know little about women’s entry into politics in countries 
without formal gender quotas. In this paper we use qualitative interview data on the nomination 
processes of Zambia’s three main political parties to explore formal and informal aspects of the 
candidate selection process. A key reason the literature is inconclusive about which candidate 
selection rules favor gender balance is that these rules tend to be poorly institutionalized, 
particularly in countries with weak party organizations and strong leaders. Although having local 
patronage networks may help to garner local support for a candidacy, often the central party 
leader is the critical decision-maker. Strikingly, Zambia’s main political parties tend to nominate 
the same number of female candidates, suggesting collusion by the political parties. Ultimately, 
all political aspirants—irrespective of gender—gain bargaining power by displaying personal 
funds and local popularity. Their loyalty to a particular party is less important.  
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Using Zambia as a case, this paper explores what it takes for a female aspirant to win a 
party nomination in a candidate-centered electoral system in an emerging democracy that does 
not have a gender quota. African political party organizations are centralized at the national level 
and excessively weak (Carbone 2007). Still, most parties wish to popularize and localize parts of 
the candidate selection, by opening up for activities that include the local branches in the process 
of decision-making. Such activities, like primaries or adoption meetings, help parties to put down 
roots in local communities, as local party members screen aspirants and provide 
recommendations to the central leadership about who the party should nominate to stand for 
election. Zambia is no different. While Zambia has had regular multiparty elections for the 
national legislature since 1991, political parties and the political party system are weakly 
institutionalized (Muriaas, Rakner, and Skage 2016). The candidate selection procedures of the 
main political parties leave it to local party members to identify aspirants and come up with 
recommendations for the national leadership which then make the final decision about who 
should be selected. These procedures result in a selection process which suffer from a lack of 
transparency and also represent a high risk for aspiring candidates. Aspirants engage in costly 
campaign activities in order to be recommended by local branches, but according to formal party 
rules the recommendations are not binding. Party leaders have the final say in any decision about 
candidacies.     
Yet in this context, and without any formal quotas for women in politics, the major 
political parties in Zambia over the past two general elections have nominated exactly the same 
number of female candidates, although, on average, women represented only 14 percent of 
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members of parliament (MPs) in Zambia from 1996 to 2016. Rules for selecting candidates are 
becoming increasingly formalized, while the requirement to nominate a certain number of 
women remains informal.   
To shed light on the puzzle of how women have gained party nominations in Zambia, we 
ask the following questions: How do formal selection procedures and an informal requirement of 
nominating a fixed number of women interact in Zambia’s political parties? What effect does 
centralized decision-making power have on women’s motivation to win a nomination when they 
have to compete in costly, non-decisive primaries at the local level?   
This article contributes to the literature on gendered political recruitment by studying 
how an ongoing process of formalizing selection rules within political parties interact with 
informal expectations of gender balance in  a single member district plurality rule system 
(hereafter, SMD system) in a democratizing state. Within the recent politics and gender 
scholarship, an emerging literature addresses not only the role of political parties as gatekeepers 
of women’s political representation, but which mode of candidate selection is most favorable to 
women, and more specifically, how the degree of party centralization and inclusiveness affects 
the likelihood of women being selected (see, e.g., Kenny 2013; Hinojosa 2012; Rahat 2007). The 
literature on formal selection rules is however inconclusive when it comes to how they affect 
gender imbalance. While some studies argue that inclusive, decentralized decision-making is 
most favorable to women (Ichino and Nathan 2012; Lovenduski and Norris 1993), others provide 
examples of why an exclusive, centralized process is more effective in correcting gender 
imbalance in candidate selection (Kenny and Verge 2013; Murray 2010; Caul 1999).  
The discussion of what type of candidate selection system that is most conducive to 
gender balance is only relevant in contexts where formal rules are effective. As argued by 
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Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006: 179), if decisions “pass through informal networks rather than a 
party bureaucracy, then analyses that focus only on formal structures will produce a flawed 
understanding of how party functions”. We argue that in emerging democracies, as well as in 
established ones, centralized nomination processes both enable and disable women in contexts 
where gender quotas are not adopted. Centralization may help enforce an informal “soft quota” 
that guarantees that at least a fixed number of women are nominated, despite male-dominated 
local party branches and a commercialized selection process. According to Bjarnegård and 
Zetterberg (2017: 3), who the main party gatekeepers are becomes crucial. Party gatekeepers 
actively encourage certain types of individuals to stand for office. In the Zambian case, 
gatekeepers could be both local party branches and the party leader. An informal soft quota could 
lead to a situation where local branches value a different set of merits than party leaders.   
Although Bjarnegård (2013) is in general critical to how informal rules such as 
clientelistic networks affect women’s chances to get recruited into politics, she also highlights 
that informal institutions might achieve what formal institutions cannot. Lauth (2000: 26) 
stresses how informal institutions provide additional channels of influence for political 
participation. Yet, as he warns, political participation shaped by informal institutions can limit 
and relativize existing democratic participation. Thus, an informal soft quota, in centralized 
candidate selection systems that includes an aspect of localism, may lead to less transparent 
processes and legitimize other informal avenues. Consequently, centralized decisions drive 
informality, and as argued by Bjarnegård (2013), informal institutions rarely benefit women 
more than men. Furthermore, informal soft quotas may act as a glass ceiling that keep more 




Our findings are based on a qualitative study of the nomination processes of Zambia’s 
three main political parties and they focus on how gender balance, meritocracy, and selection 
procedures interact. The field study was carried out in Lusaka, Zambia, in June and July 2015. In 
all, we conducted 41 semi-structured interviews with MPs, representatives of women’s 
organizations, secretaries of political parties, government officials, international donors, and 
academic consultants. During these interviews, we explored the role of party leadership in the 
political recruitment process, as well as which factors local selectorates (that is, members of local 
party committees) prioritize when they identify their preferred candidates. Through both 
conversations and carefully selected questions from an interview guide, we identified some of 
the crucial mechanisms at play when candidates are nominated to stand on a party ticket.  
 
Parties and gendered candidate selection 
African party systems are characterized by instability and a generally low level of 
institutionalization. Individual party organizations are frequently excessively weak, centralized, 
and dominated by personalist and informal practices (Carbone 2007).  This mix of weak party 
institutionalization and executive dominance provides fertile ground for neopatrimonialism or 
what has been termed “big man” politics—where power is concentrated in “big” men (i.e., party 
leaders) and their allies who informally make decisions and are linked through personal, 
patronage, and clientelist networks. Party leadership has typically been dominated by men, while 
women have often been relegated to separate women’s structures within the parties (Tripp et al. 
2009, 147). Political parties in Zambia are no exception. Most political parties are formed around 
a powerful and ambitious leader, rather than around an ideology; this leads to fractious party 
splits and undermines cooperation in policy making (Rakner and Svåsand 2012). 
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 Three decades after the third wave of democratization hit the African continent, 
however, candidate selection procedures within political parties are becoming increasingly 
formalized. Yet, we know little about how selection processes unfold in African parties or their 
gendered consequences (Field and Siavelis 2008). Academic literature on the topic is limited to a 
handful of case studies, and most do not explicitly focus on the gendered consequences of 
selection procedures (on South Africa and Namibia, see Giollabhuí 2013; on Ghana, see Ichino 
and Nathan 2012, 2016; Osei 2016; Öhman 2004). 
Certainly, the mode of candidate selection may have gendered effects. Early research into 
this relationship finds a tension between highly inclusive candidate selection methods and 
achieving diversity and balance in representation (Caul 1999; Rahat 2007, 166). In a more recent 
study, focusing on Latin America, Hinojosa (2012, 43–50) analyzes degrees of centralization and 
exclusivity in selection processes, including the informal nature of candidate selection. She finds 
that exclusive-centralized selection is most advantageous in terms of increasing women’s 
representation, implying that procedures often considered as most “democratic” (that is, 
inclusive-decentralized procedures) are less beneficial to female candidates. Intriguingly, in a 
comparative study of Thailand and Scotland, Bjarnegård and Kenny (2016) find that, despite 
candidate selection being formally centralized in both cases, it is informally decentralized, 
localized, and marked by clientelism and patronage. In this informal recruitment system, key 
local party actors in positions of power (mainly men) are able to use informality to keep 
outsiders (mainly women) from taking part in their networks. They thus argue that localized 
processes are likely to be marked by informal practices of local patronage and clientelism and 
that these mechanisms tend to “operate differently for men and women, with women positioned 
as “gendered ‘outsiders’ to the process and therefore unable to gain access to political power” 
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(Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016, 386–387). Consistent with this, Medeiros, Forest and Erl (this 
issue), point to how local party cultures and networks in Canada may act as obstacles in the 
recruitment of women candidates. 
Findings from the nascent scholarship on Africa show that there is a trend towards the 
holding of party primaries to elect candidates. In their study of candidate selection in Ghana’s 
ruling party, Ichino and Nathan (2016) find that primaries increase the number of aspirants 
seeking nomination, including the number of women. Their reasoning is that patronage-based 
politics are more difficult in open primaries and consequently female aspirants (who often have a 
lower capacity to buy votes) face a smaller disadvantage. However, the question remains 
whether female aspirants have the merits required to be selected as candidates. The scholarly 
literature provides no common understanding of how “merit” should be defined, and the criteria 
tend to range from objective to subjective, according to who you ask (Murray 2015).  
Although research on gendered candidate qualifications is scarce in the African context, 
we do, know something about voter expectations in Africa, in particular, that constituents 
fiercely demand community development and even personal benefits (Hyden 2013, 51; Lindberg 
2010). Vote-buying and hand-outs to mobilize voters are widespread during general elections 
and are even common phenomena during primaries (Ichino and Nathan 2012; Lindberg 2010). 
This naturally affects the priorities of party selectorates. What is less discussed is the effects of 
vote-buying on formal candidate selection procedures in many African parties. Since parties 
usually originate as election vehicles for party leaders, party leaders typically formally have the 
final say in who gets nominated. The need to open up and popularize the selection process, to 
meet demands from the communities, have resulted in the organization of recommendation 
meetings at the local level. Both these processes are formalized, but they tend to create frictions 
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when party leaders do not follow the recommendations of the local branches, by for example, 
nominating a female candidate not favored by local branches.  
 
Candidate selection and gender imbalance in Zambia 
Zambia is a typical case of a democratizing African state that introduced multiparty 
elections in the 1990s and has experienced at least one turnover in the executive party as a 
consequence of popular elections (Bwalya and Maharaj 2017). Compared to some of its 
neighboring countries, Zambian opposition parties are relatively strong (LeBas 2011), and 
elections are highly competitive (Goldring and Wahman 2016). Still, the major parties remain 
highly centralized and the ruling party prefers to build coalitions with individual opposition MPs 
rather than negotiating with opposition parties (Muriaas, Rakner, and Skage 2016). This 
characteristic fit the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) when it was in power and 
later the Patriotic Front (PF). Party loyalty is thus minimal due to constant party switching.  
Within this context, gender balance in political recruitment has remained low. Still, for a 
sub-Saharan country with SMD and no electoral gender quotas, Zambia is performing rather well 
(see figure 1), although it remains well below the regional average of 23.7 percent women in 
parliament in 2017.   
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Figure 1. Percentages of female members of parliament in countries in sub-Saharan Africa with 
a single-member district electoral system and no quotas, 1997–2016 
 
Taking a closer look at candidate nominations, only one out of six candidates were 
women in the 2011 and 2016 elections. This low number of female candidates indicates that the 
source of women’s underrepresentation stems from what takes place during the candidate 
nomination process within the political parties. Table 1 shows a striking pattern between the 
nomination of female candidates in the 2011 and 2016 elections. In 2011, the three main political 
parties were MMD, PF, and the United Party for National Development (UPND), and each party 
nominated 20 female candidates.  
Table 1. Candidate success rates (%) by gender 
 2011 Parliamentary Elections  2016 Parliamentary Elections 
 Male Female Male Female 
 % N % N % N % N 
PF 41.7 (12753) 40.0 (208) 53.6 (12567) 44.8 (2913) 
UPND 23.7 (11427) 10.0 (202) 37.5 (12848) 34.5 (2910) 
IND 2.6 (1163) 0.0 (210) 12.6 (9512) 25.0 (82) 
MMD 38.3 (12849) 30.0 (206) 11.5 (263) 0.0 (100) 
FDD 4.0 (251) 0.0 (50) 0.0 (900) 5.3 (191) 
Others 0.0 (1350) 4.5 (221) 0.0 (850) 0.0 (100) 
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Total 20.6 (647133) 15.7 (10817) 23.7 (549130) 24.8 (10526) 
In parentheses: number of candidatesnumber of winners; Patriotic Front (PF), United Party for National 
Development (UPND), IND (Independent candidates), Movement of Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), Forum for 
Democracy and Development (FDD)  
 
In 2016, there were only two main parties contesting, since MMD dismantled after PF 
won the 2011 presidential elections. The outcome of the selection process was that PF and 
UPND nominated 29 female candidates each (see table 1). If the similarity in female candidates 
nominated by key parties is not coincidental, but an understanding agreed upon by party leaders, 
we see the contours of an informal soft quota for women. If so, the enforcement of the agreement 
is made possible due to the centralized decision-making power of party leaders during the 
selection processes.  
 
Centralization: Soft party quotas, but hard glass ceilings  
As argued by Caul (1999, 80), “[i]n a highly centralized party, leaders have the control to 
create openings for women—when they want to do so.” The Zambian case clearly illustrates this 
point, but highlights that centralized party decisions can be both enabling as well as disabling for 
female aspirants. Centralization is enabling because, regardless of how the rest of the selection 
process plays out, the party leader can select a woman if he or she so wants, and can even 
enforce a soft quota that establishes a fixed number of female candidates. A soft quota aims to 
increase women’s representation indirectly through internal party quotas or more directly 
through informal targets and recommendations (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009, 786). Yet 
centralization can also be disabling if soft quotas create a glass ceiling because party leaders 
informally and secretly collude to decide that only a set number of women will go through. 
However, the centralized nomination process is preceded by an elaborate and locally 
grounded nomination process. Aspirants seek to obtain support from their parties at the local and 
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provincial levels, so that leaders at those levels will recommend them for nomination at the 
national level. Therefore, to understand the gendered consequences of party recruitment 
processes, it is important to explore how the selection processes within the main political parties 
unfold at all levels, as well as the role that party leaders play.  
Although the main parties have formal rules regarding how the selection process should 
be organized, the transparency of the process tends to be affected by the expectations of those 
involved, the party leader’s control, and features of a weakly institutionalized party system in a 
post-authoritarian setting. Under Zambia’s prior one-party-rule, the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) had forced membership and open primaries where candidates were 
elected to political offices. The post-authoritarian party MMD, which emerged as the new ruling 
party, introduced a more exclusive system of candidate selection, and MMD’s splinter party (PF) 
also adopted this system. As shown in Table 2, the formal route towards party candidacy in 
MMD and PF, similar to what has been defined by Momba (2005), is that aspirants are 
interviewed at three different levels of the party organization. The recommendations from each 
level are noted and passed on to the next level; ultimately, the national party leadership makes 
the final decision.  
<insert table 2> 
UPND has a slightly more inclusive system than the other parties. It has an advisory 
primary at the constituency level, where aspirants present themselves and members of the local 
committees vote by secret ballot. The results of this election are passed on to the party 
leadership, which decides whether it will follow the advisory results.  Nonetheless, party leaders 
do take into account recommendations from lower party branches, and the aspirant favored by 
the local branch is in a strong position to be nominated.  
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In this system, at least three factors make it difficult for women aspirants to succeed in 
becoming the favored candidate at the local party branch level, according to a representative 
from the Center for Intra-party Dialogue (as well as others we interviewed). First, the 
composition of nominating committees affects gender balance; “women are disadvantaged 
because they [nominating committees] are heavily male populated. There are so many men. So 
the chances of men thinking about a woman is very small.” Second, the male selectorate has a 
very specific image of the homo politicus: “Parties are patriarchal, they have the image of a 
father figure, the father of the party.” Third, women have a difficult time accessing the money 
that plays an important role in Zambian politics: “Women are economically disempowered in 
this part of the world. They are not financially prepared to have the kind of campaign that brings 
victory. You know, Zambian elections are highly commercialized, mostly it is the men that have 
that resources to give to the party to do elections” (interview 1 July 2015). 
The importance of sufficient finances was highlighted in all the interviews with both 
successful and unsuccessful candidates, as well as with members of international and domestic 
NGOs in Zambia. One female MP explained, “In Zambia, the system is such that the parties have 
to finance their own candidates, but the parties don’t have money. So at the end of the day, it is 
the individual candidates that finance their own elections.” She continued by giving an example 
of how aspirants go about convincing the local selectorate about their merits: “The male 
aspirants say, ‘I can bring in vehicles, I’m going to put in maybe the equivalent of 20,000 
dollars,’ and then the women say, ‘I can put in 2,000 dollars.’ So the parties get discouraged” 
(interview 15 July 2015). Zambia is ranked as number 116 out of 145 countries in the Global 
Gender Gap Report of 2015 (World Economic Forum 2015). This indicates the existence of 
gendered structural differences, not only in who has financial resources to fund their own 
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campaign, but also which networks they are able to tap into for funding. This is further stressed 
by work finding that women’s lower socio-economic positions mean that women “may lack the 
economic independence to pursue a political career” (Ballington and Kahane 2014: 304). Even 
elite women are likely to be affected by such relations as it produces cultural expectations and 
gendered stereotypes.  
Not only the elections themselves, but also the grassroots selection processes within 
political parties (particularly in party strongholds) are very expensive. According to a news 
source, the UPND aspirants in some constituency primaries gave up to K500 (US$52) to each 
member of the selectorate to be placed at the top of the recommendation list (Lusaka Times 
2016). A representative of the Zambia National Women’s Lobby also highlighted the issue of 
money when she commented on the corrupt selectorate, “The ones that have paid the most are 
the ones that they normally adopt [nominate]” (interview July 9, 2015).  
Centralization could thus be seen as a remedy against the negative gendered effects of 
commercialized nomination processes, male-dominated selectorates, and gendered stereotypes 
about a father-like “ideal” candidate. Yet a party leader’s centralized powers can also 
disadvantage women. Participation in localized selection processes can clearly be discouraging, 
but some women can be well-known in their communities and have support from influential 
local leaders, although they have never been in a position where they have to negotiate with the 
party leadership in the capital. In a centralized nomination system, aspirants participate in several 
rallies and are interviewed at different stages, but may end up not winning the nomination, even 
if they are the most popular person at the local level. As one female parliamentarian explained, 
“Well, it’s the corruption, you have to pay some people to support you. . . . But there is not so 
much transparency, so in the constituency you come out as number one, in the district number 
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five. . . .There is this fluctuation. There is no consistency” (interview July 15, 2015). Since the 
central party leader can overrule the recommendations of local party branches, the local selection 
process is in danger of being reduced to keeping local party branch members happy by giving 
them food, sugar, transport, or cash, without knowing if these personal outlays will lead to 
personal success. Still, as argued by Norris (1996), different actors are important at different 
stages of the process, and it is difficult to determine which part of the process that is most 
decisive in terms of the final outcome.  
Under current candidate selection systems in Zambia, aspirants cannot know based on 
their experience at the local level whether they will be nominated. The final result of the 
selection process is announced when the nomination list is submitted to the national electoral 
commission by the party leader. Until then, it is unclear whether recommendations given at the 
subnational level will be followed. For example, the UPND national leadership ignored local 
level protests when it selected Patricia Mwashingwele as a candidate in Katuba constituency, 
even though the primary was won by a man (Daily Nation 2016). By contrast, a well-known 
women’s rights activist was led to believe that she was ranked as the favorite by all subnational 
branch selection committees, but was turned down by the central committee, which picked a man 
(interview July 10, 2015). The combination of centralized decision making and a fairly inclusive 
system of local recommendation formation makes the nomination process costly and the 
outcome uncertain. Hence, what women potentially might gain from an informal soft quota deal 
among party leaders is lost by the discouragement of having to participate in primaries where 
local-level recommendations are not necessarily followed by the central party leadership.   
The informal soft quota is also a hard ceiling. It is difficult for women to gain the 
necessary leverage vis-à-vis the central party leader, since there are few opportunities for women 
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to build a career within the party organization. Women interested in participating in politics are 
typically relegated to the women’s wings of the parties. MPs and party politicians, however, 
made it clear that women’s wings rarely advance the candidacy of its own members. The reason 
for this is that women’s wings are used as mobilizing engines, that sings and dance at rallies, 
rather than a place for those who sympathize with the parties’ platform and use the structure to 
build a career. Consequently, this formally crucial party structure does not constitute an avenue 
for recruiting female candidates. If female candidates are not backed by the women’s wing and 
not backed by local recommendations, but handed over by party leaders, their power base is 
bound to be shaky if elected.   
 
Conclusions  
In Zambia, the combination of strong party leaders and demands for primaries from local 
communities produces noteworthy effects. Although the local party branches would like to see 
their recommendations being followed, primaries also serve an additional purpose. The local-
level candidate nomination processes represent an opportunity for local party members to benefit 
from their party loyalty.  Aspirants must provide payments, bribes, food, and transportation to 
show off their resources and popularity, even though their successful efforts at the local level 
might have no bearing on the central party leader’s final nomination decision. Although the local 
candidate selection process could be seen as a necessary ritual for aspirants, time and time again 
it is demonstrated that a good bargain with the party leader may be the only critical key to 
coming out as a top nominee.  
This article addresses the gendered effects of leader-centered candidate nomination 
processes in Zambia, a democratizing country. Indeed, centralized nomination processes make it 
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possible for party leaders to enforce an informal soft quota that ensures that a certain number of 
women are nominated as candidates. However, this soft quota can also act as a glass ceiling that 
keeps qualified women from being nominated, thereby undermining increased gender balance in 
political recruitment. Party leaders hold the power to decide how many women will actually win 
a nomination and appear to informally collude and coordinate their decisions.  
During the selection process, many female aspirants run their campaign on false hopes 
that focus on convincing the local selectorate, but often the selected few who end up being 
nominated as candidates win their selection through a bargain with the central party leader, not 
through the support of their local committees. Furthermore, party leaders are highly unlikely to 
go beyond the soft quota in nominating female candidates, even if there are more qualified 
women in the race. Based on our study, we encourage more work on candidate selection in 
democratizing states without gender quotas, in particular, studies that focus on how political 
financing affects candidate selection. Zambia has hardly any formal regulations on party funding 
and no public funding. Perhaps political finance could be used as a tool to assist female aspirants 
in becoming candidates. 
References 
Ballington, Julie and Murial Kahane. 2014. Women in Politics: Financing for Gender Equality. 
In Funding of Political Parties and Elections Campaigns: A Handbook on Political 
Finance, edited by Elin Falguera, Samuel Jones and Magnus Ohman, 301-343. 
Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.  
Bjarnegård, Elin. 2013. Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining 
Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.   
17 
 
Bjarnegård, Elin, and Meryl Kenny. 2016. “Comparing Candidate Selection: A Feminist 
Institutional Approach.” Government and Opposition 51 (3): 370–392. 
doi:10.1017/gov.2016.4. 
Bjarnegård, Elin and Pär Zetterberg (2017). Political parties, formal selection criteria, and 
gendered parliamentary representation. Party Politics, online first.   
Bwalya, John, and Brij Maharaj. 2017. “Not to the Highest Bidder: The Failure of Incumbency 
in the Zambian 2011 Elections.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 36 (1): 71–86. 
doi:10.1080/02589001.2017.1369014. 
Carbone, Giovanni M. 2007. “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and 
Research Perspectives.” World Political Science 3 (3): 1–29. doi:10.2202/1935-
6226.1023. 
Caul, Miki. 1999. “Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties.” Party 
Politics 5 (1): 79–98. doi:10.1177/1354068899005001005. 
Daily Nation. 2016. “Katuba protestors storm HH’s home.” May 30. 
https://zambiadailynation.com/2016/05/30/katuba-protestors-storm-hhs-home/ 
Field, Bonnie N., and Peter M. Siavelis. 2008. “Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional 
Politics: A Research Note.” Party Politics 14 (5): 620–639. 
doi:10.1177/1354068808093393. 
Freidenberg, Flavia. and Steven Levitsky. 2006. Informal Party Organization in Latin America. 
In Informal Institutions and Democracy in Latin America: Understanding the Rules of the 
Game, edited by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, 178-197. Washington, D.C.: 
John Hopkins University Press. 
18 
 
Giollabhuí, Shane Mac. 2013. “How Things Fall Apart: Candidate Selection and the Cohesion of 
Dominant Parties in South Africa and Namibia.” Party Politics 19 (4): 577–600. 
doi:10.1177/1354068811407599. 
Goldring, Edward, and Michael Wahman. 2016. “Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 General 
Election in Zambia.” Africa Spectrum 51 (3): 107–121. https://journals.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/990. 
Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and 
Candidate Selection in Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
Hydén, Göran. 2013. African Politics in Comparative Perspective. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. 2012. “Primaries on Demand? Intra-party Politics and 
Nominations in Ghana.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 769–791. 
doi:10.1017/S0007123412000014. 
Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. 2016. “Democratizing the Party: The Effects of Primary 
Election Reforms in Ghana.” Working paper, University of Michigan. 
http://cpd.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/IchinoNathan_democratizing_the_party.pdf. 
Kenny, Meryl. 2013. Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change. 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kenny, Meryl, and Tànya Verge. 2013. “Decentralization, Political Parties, and Women’s 
Representation: Evidence from Spain and Britain.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
43 (1): 109–128. doi:10.1093/publius/pjs023. 
19 
 
Krook, Mona Lena, Joni Lovenduski, and Judith Squires. 2009. “Gender Quotas and Models of 
Political Citizenship.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 781–803. 
doi:10.1017/S0007123409990123. 
Lauth, Hans-Joachim. 2000. “Informal Institutions and Democracy.” Democratization 7 (4): 21-
50.  
LeBas, Adrienne. 2011. From Protest to Parties: Party-building and Democratization in Africa. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2010. “What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do 
They Respond? Evidence from Ghana.” Journal of Modern African Studies 48 (1): 117–
142. doi:10.1017/S0022278X09990243. 
Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris. 1993. Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage. 
Lusaka Times. 2016. “UPND’s Internal Party violence during primaries should be condemned-
GYZ.” Apr. 28. https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/04/28/118405/ 
Momba, Jotham. 2005. “Political Parties and the Quest for Democratic Consolidation in 
Zambia.” EISA Research Report No. 17. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa. https://www.africaportal.org/publications/political-
parties-and-the-quest-for-democratic-consolidation-in-zambia/. 
Murray, Rainbow. 2010. Parties, Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection in France. 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Murray, Rainbow. 2015. “What Makes a Good Politician? Reassessing the Criteria Used for 




Muriaas, Ragnhild L., Lise Rakner, and Ingvild Aagedal Skage. 2016. “Political Capital of 
Ruling Parties after Regime Change: Contrasting Successful Insurgencies to Peaceful 
Pro-democracy Movements.” Civil Wars. 18 (2): 175–191. 
doi:10.1080/13698249.2016.1205563. 
Norris, Pippa. 1996. Legislative Recruitment. In Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting 
in Global Perspective, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris, 184-
215. London: Sage.  
Osei, Anja. 2016. “Formal Party Organisation and Informal Relations in African Parties: 
Evidence from Ghana.” Journal of Modern African Studies 54 (1): 37–66. 
doi:10.1017/S0022278X15000981. 
Öhman, Magnus. 2004. “The Heart and Soul of the Party: Candidate Selection in Ghana and 
Africa.” PhD diss., Uppsala University. 
Rahat, Gideon. 2007. “Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice.” Journal of 
Democracy 18 (1): 157–170. doi:10.1353/jod.2007.0014. 
Rakner, Lise, and Lars Svåsand. 2012. “In Search of the Impact of International Support for 
Political Parties in New Democracies: Malawi and Zambia Compared.” In Promoting 
Party Politics in Emerging Democracies, edited by Peter Burnell and André W. M. 
Gerrits, 186–210. London: Routledge. 
Tripp, Aili Mari, Isabel Casimiro, Joy C. Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa 2009. African Women’s 
Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
World Economic Forum. 2015. The Global Gender Gap Report 2015. Geneva: World Economic 
Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR2015/cover.pdf  
21 
 
 
 
 
 
